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ABSTRACT PAGE
Deloache, Uttal, and Rosengren (2004) reported that 18-to- 30-month-old children 
som etim es failed to use  information about an object’s  size and tried to perform impossible 
actions on miniature objects. The researchers believed this w as a perception-action 
dissociation in the behavioral responses of normally developing young children and 
interpreted these  scale  errors a s  problems with inhibitory control and the integration of 
visual information for perception and action. In our current study we investigate the 
similarities betw een scale  errors and other developm ental errors to find which 
characteristics about these  tasks cau se  children to m ake an inappropriate or inaccurate 
action responses. W e attem pt to determine which object characteristics increase or 
d ecrease  the occurrence of scale errors and believe that children of all ag es  (and possibly 
adults) can commit these  scale  errors given a  specific cue or situation.
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1Investigating Scale Errors: Independent Systems of Object Representation or Simple
Motor Priming?
People of all ages make use of visual information to guide their behaviors or 
responses while interacting with their environments. They are usually accurate in their 
judgments but when faced with certain situations, they sometimes make very salient 
errors in their responses. In these instances adults and children seem to be cognitively 
aware of things but fail to act appropriately on the basis of their knowledge. Researchers 
have labeled these unique situations as “dissociations” or “errors” and some researchers 
have even suggested there is a dissociation between the knowledge and action systems 
that is both neural and psychological. Many believe that this dissociation occurs when the 
action system is impaired or not fully developed whereas the knowledge system is fully 
functioning (Goodale & Milner, 1992; Diamond, 1991). Examining these errors from a 
developmental perspective can lead to a better understanding of motor, perceptual, and 
cognitive processes interact and how the environment influences these processes. 
A-not-B-Error
A classic developmental error first described by Piaget (1954) is the A-not-B 
error. It has been demonstrated that before 7 or 8 months of age, infants seem to refuse to 
search for a toy that has been hidden under a cover. Early researchers described this 
phenomenon as if the toy stopped existing in the minds of the infants. After 12 months of 
age infants will continue to search for the toy, even if the toy is hidden in several 
different places. The A-not-B error occurs during 7-12 months when infants will search at 
one location and will continue to search at the first location even when they visibly see 
the experimenter hide the toy in an adjacent location underneath an identical cloth. This
2error is very robust when assessed in this manner, but as soon as even small variations 
take place, the error can be disrupted and the infant will search correctly at the second 
location to obtain the toy. For instance, making the hiding covers more distinct in color 
from one another can lead to an increase in accurate reaching (Wellman, Cross, & 
Bartsch, 1986).
In his original observations of the A-not-B search task, Piaget (1954) reported that 
infants would occasionally look to the correct location while reaching perseveratively at 
the incorrect location. Perseveration is the repetition of previously performed but now 
inappropriate act and has been attributed to strong motor memories. The more times an 
infant reaches to a particular location, the stronger the motor memory and frequency of 
that perseverative behavior (Diedrich, Thelen, Smith, & Corbetta, 2000).
Neural network models have demonstrated that perseveration could arise from 
Hebbian learning mechanisms because the neural network will tend to strengthen 
whatever response is made to a stimulus (Munakata, 1998). Perhaps this simple neuronal 
tendency could provide an account for why these inappropriate action responses occur 
and perseverative behaviors could result from the formation of a tightly bound ensemble 
of neuronal activity created by highly similar and repeated responses (Diedrich, Thelen, 
Smith, & Corbetta, 2000).
Edelman (1987) found that neural ensembles that are simultaneously and 
repeatedly activated together become stronger and more likely to become activated again. 
This is derived from the concept of Hebbian learning which states that a neuron’s 
contribution to the firing of another neuron could increase if that cell is repeatedly 
involved in the activation of the second (Hebb, 1949). This concept may be particularly
3relevant for certain kinds of statistical learning that appear to occur without any overt task 
or directed effort to learn. This automatic or self-organizing nature of Hebbian learning 
could simply happen in response to a selection of inputs from the environment, without 
any consideration of what outputs or behaviors should be produced in response to those 
inputs (Munakata & Pfaffly, 2004).
There have been many studies using visual violation-of-expectancy measures to 
show that although infants will consistently make the A-not-B error when reaching for 
hidden objects, they do seem to expect that the objects will be found in the correct 
location when no action response is required (Baillargeon & Graber, 1988). In these 
studies looking time measures were employed and when the infant does not have to 
produce an action response and is only required to produce a looking response, infants 
seem to know the correct location of the hidden object. Longer looking times indicate a 
violation of expectancy and infants will look longer when the hidden object is not 
retrieved from the correct location. There have been many different explanations for this 
apparent dissociation. Some researchers believe that reaching involves a stronger object 
representation than looking (Munakata et al. 1997), while others believe it is the case that 
the “knowing” system is unable to control the “acting” system (Bertenthal, 1996).
Some researchers believe that these dissociations are failures of the child’s 
executive function system and could be attributed to an inability to inhibit inappropriate 
responding (Diamond, 2002; Zelazo & Frye, 1998). Executive function refers to 
processes responsible for higher-level action control (including inhibition, planning, 
coordination and the control of action sequences) that are necessary for maintaining a 
specified goal and avoiding distractions (Duncan 1986; Carlson, Mandell, & Williams,
42004; Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, & Frye, 1997). The standard executive function task is 
characterized by the need to inhibit an interfering response inclination. Executive 
inhibition is necessary when automatic inhibition and high activation of the desired action 
schema fails (Pemer & Lang, 1999).
There are two general kinds of tasks to assess children’s inhibitory control and 
task performance improves as a function of age with both assessments. A widely used 
example of an executive function task is Luria’s hand game. In this task the participant is 
instructed to do the opposite of what the experimenter does. The natural tendency to 
imitate the experimenter interferes with the objective of the game (Luria, Pribram, & 
Homskaya, 1964). A similar task is the Gift Delay Task where an experimenter instructs 
the participants to not peek while the experimenter noisily wraps a present for them. This 
kind of task measures a child’s ability to suppress or delay an impulsive response 
(Carlson & Moses, 2001). Another task used to measure inhibitory control requires that 
children answer a certain way, even in the event of a highly salient and conflicting 
response option. Cards with pictures o f either the sun or moon are presented to 3-to-7- 
year-old children and the participants are instructed to say “night” in response to the sun 
cards and “day” in response to the moon cards (Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994).
Inhibitory control is the capacity to inhibit responses to irrelevant stimuli while 
pursuing a cognitively represented goal and this has been thought to be a factor in the 
developmental changes of a wide variety of cognitive abilities including intelligence, 
attention, memory, emotion regulation and social competence (Carlson, & Moses, 2001). 
Developments in inhibitory control mainly occur within the first six years of life, and this 
notion has been supported by both behavioral and neuropsychological evidence. Research
5has identified the prefrontal cortex as a key component of inhibition and other aspects of 
executive functioning. Brain maturation research indicates that the prefrontal cortex is a 
slowly maturing brain area with the frontal lobes developing rapidly during infancy, a 
period of developmental delay, and then another growth spurt between the ages of four 
and seven (Carlson, & Moses, 2001; Luria, 1973). Behavioral and fMRI studies indicate 
that executive control processes such as response inhibition are not fully developed until 
adolescence (Luna & Sweeney, 2004).
These behavioral errors could be attributed not to dissociations in knowledge and 
action but to the type of response required of the child. For example, infants demonstrate 
much more knowledge of hidden objects when looking time is as used a dependent 
measure instead of reaching (Baillargeon, Graber, DeVos, & Black, 1990). Diamond 
(1985; 1988; 1990a; 1990b) completed a series of studies to explain this discrepancy and 
believed that the error results from both the infants’ poor memories for the hiding place 
and their inability to inhibit strong motor responses. The researcher concluded that the 
delay aspect of the task was very important to decrease memory of the hiding event and 
to decrease the ability to inhibit the prepotent response.
Another explanation for this inconsistency is that the infant simply makes a reach 
to the wrong location. This means that the infant may be knowledgeable of the location of 
the object but merely reaches to a different location. Previous studies have shown that 
infants usually represent space egocentrically rather than based on the target object’s 
position and infants who have been accustomed to reach to position A will continue to 
reach for the same location (relative to their own bodies) even if the table has been turned 
180 degrees and the two locations have now been switched (Bremner & Bryant, 1977).
6Slight variations in testing conditions will easily lead the infant to reach in the 
correct position. Clues within the environment that to help distinguish between the two 
targets (e.g. adding landmarks to the surrounding, making the hiding covers more 
distinct, testing the infants in a more familiar location, etc) have been shown to decrease 
the frequency of perseverative reaching (Acredolo, 1985; Wellman et al. 1986). There 
have also been studies to show that even the infants’ level of experience in self­
locomotion was strongly related to the frequency of correct reaches in the A-not-B task 
(Bertenthal & Campos, 1990). It seems as though this “error” is a result of the infants’ 
response to a set of very specific parameters and the frequency of errors can be 
manipulated accordingly.
To account for the variability of results within the various A-not-B error tasks, 
Thelen, Schoner, Scheier, & Smith (2001) have presented a model to explain this 
inconsistency in results. The dynamic systems approach to the A-not-B error looks at the 
different motor, perceptual and cognitive processes contributing to the behavior as being 
coupled interactions which are continuous and based in time. The researchers believe that 
this model not only accounts for the search error but also how the perseverative 
responding changes due to age or environment. They believe that this error evolves from 
the same multiple processes that generate goal-directed reaching at any age.
Previous explanations have rooted the cause of the A-not-B error to infants’ 
deficits in object knowledge, spatial localization, memory, or inhibition (Marcovitch, & 
Zelazo, 1999; Munakata, 1997; Wellman et al., 1986) but in the dynamic systems 
approach the attention is focused on the reaching aspect of the error and the processes 
that lead to a directional reach to the incorrect and correct target locations. The
researchers of this model believe that the relative ambiguity of the task is a very 
important parameter in the model and the relative strength of the specific input is also an 
essential component. In their explanation, the error emerges in the context of the specific 
behavior or reaching and infants make perseverative location errors because the motor 
memory of one reach persists and influences subsequent behaviors (Thelen et al., 2001). 
Card Sorting Error
Another paradigm that has been used frequently to investigate the occurrence of 
knowledge/action dissociations is the rule use paradigm (Luria, 1961; Zelazo & Reznick, 
1991). In a rule task the children are given explicit instructions and must use the 
instructions to guide their actions. Zelazo and Reznick (1991) found that 3-year-olds 
were able to use a specific rule to guide their behavior (sorting all the triangle cards from 
the circle cards into the appropriate trays) but Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai (1995) found age 
related differences in the card sort task between the ages of 3- and 5-years of age when 
the child was asked to switch to a new rule. The 3-year-olds would successfully sort the 
cards based on the first rule (sort by color) but when asked to switch to a new rule (sort 
by shape), they persisted in sorting the cards according to the first rule even when they 
were repeatedly reminded of the new rule on every trial. Interestingly enough, the 4- or 5- 
year-olds were able to switch to the new rules almost immediately (Frye, Zelazo, Palfai, 
1995). Just like the A-not-B-error, the card sorting error posed the question of whether 
the child is knowledgeable about the new rule and just cannot inhibit a motor response or 
if there is an expression of cognitive immaturity within the 3-year-olds.
Zelazo, Frye & Rapus (1996) wanted to see if the children who were not able to 
switch between rule pairs could identify the new rule. In this experiment the researchers
8gave 3- and 4-year-old children the dimensional change card sort as in the previous study, 
and then had the children complete additional trials to assess the children’s understanding 
of the post-switch rules. After the post-switch trials, the children were asked two 
knowledge questions and one action question. For the knowledge questions the children 
were asked what the rules of the game were and the children were asked to point to the 
appropriate tray. For the action question the children were given another sorting trial 
similar to the post-switch trials where the child had to place the card in the appropriate 
tray according to the experimenter’s instruction.
The researchers found that regardless of which dimension (color or shape) was 
presented to the children first, 3-year-olds were more likely than 4-year-olds to continue 
using the first rules during the post-switch trials. The 3-year-olds (and a couple of the 4- 
year olds who failed during the post-switch trials) demonstrated during the additional 
trials that they understood the new rule (would point to the appropriate tray when 
questioned about a rule) but continued to sort based on the pre-switch rule even during 
the action question. This indicates that the 3-year-olds were cognitively aware of the new 
rule but could not inhibit the overwhelming perseverative motor response.
To challenge the idea of perseverative responses the researchers wanted to also 
examine whether this apparent dissociation between knowledge and action was due to a 
failure to inhibit overly learned responses to the test cards. The idea that response 
interference increases as a function of the number of pre-switch trials would support the 
notion of perseverative behaviors. Therefore the researchers in a second experiment gave 
the 3-year-olds one trial before a new rule was introduced. The results indicated that a 
majority of the 3-year-olds perseverated even after only one pre-switch trial. The
9researchers concluded that although a possibility, it is very unlikely that a 3-year-olds’ 
ability to inhibit is so weak that one pre-switch trial could provide enough interference to 
produce inhibitory failure and produce an inappropriate response. In a subsequent 
experiment, the researchers also determined that 3-year-olds continued to perseverate 
even when they were instructed to respond verbally to the task; this indicates that 
response modality is not a factor and the children continue to have difficulty switching 
rules even when they need to use verbal knowledge.
A more recent study involving the use of the card sorting task and the 
investigation into the knowledge-action dissociation revealed different results that 
challenged interpretations of previous study results. Munakata & Yerys (2001) believed 
that the key to the apparent dissociation lies in the degree of conflict presented to the 
child. They assert that the action measure has inherent conflict where the child must sort 
a card with conflicting cues of color and shape into the appropriate tray, whereas the 
knowledge measure does not provide a corresponding conflict (the children are simply 
asked to repeat the rule). To assess this theory the researchers tested the role of conflict 
in dissociations between knowledge and action in the card-sorting task.
The children were presented with the standard version of the task with nonconflict 
and conflict knowledge questions. An example of a conflict knowledge question would 
be, “Where do the red trucks go in the shape game?” The results indicated that 
knowledge and action measures were the same when the child was presented with a 
conflict knowledge question, demonstrating that the observed dissociations between 
knowledge and action in the previous card sorting tasks could be associated with the 
degree of object representation (Munakata & Yerys, 2001). The researchers theorize that
10
dissociations between knowledge and action may reflect relatively weak representations 
that are adequate for some types of tasks but not others. They believe that stronger 
representations are needed when children face conflicting cues and this apparent 
knowledge-action dissociation is not based on a child’s failure to use their knowledge 
appropriately. Like the previous A-not-B-error studies, a simple change in the way the 
task is presented to the child can reduce the instances of error and decrease the apparent 
dissociation between knowledge and action.
Scale Errors
A more recently investigated developmental “error” that is the basis for the 
present study is the scale error first described by DeLoache, Uttal, & Rosengren (2004). 
The study concept originated from informal observations of young children attempting to 
perform actions that were, due to the object’s size relative to the child, impossible.
Parents and experimenters, in the research lab or from home accounts, witnessed children 
trying to get inside of small toy cars, putting doll shoes on their own feet, or trying to sit 
in dollhouse chairs. These children seemed to make serious attempts at these behaviors 
and the researchers believed that this was a failure or “error” by the children to use visual 
information about size when interacting with the objects.
In order to investigate these strange occurrences, the researchers set up a study to 
systematically examine the incidences of scale errors. The researchers recruited 54 
children (29 girls, 25 boys) between 18 and 30 months of age (M = 22 months) to 
participate in the study. The children were observed in a laboratory playroom with 
various toys. There were three large target toys -  an indoor slide, a child-size chair, and a 
child-size toy car but the room also contained many other toys and the children were free
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to choose what toy to interact with. If the child did not spontaneously interact with the 
target toys, the experimenter prompted the child to play with the three target toys at least 
twice. The child was then lead out of the room and the three large target toys were 
replaced with three identical miniature target toys. The child was then returned to the 
room and allowed to play with the various toys again. If the child did not spontaneously 
interact with the miniature replicas, the experimenter would once again prompt the child 
to interact with them but did not comment on the size of the object.
Very conservative criteria were used in the identification of scale errors. All 
children were videotaped and a primary coder identified a behavior as a scale error if the 
following requirements were met: (1) the child attempted to perform part or all of the 
same action with the miniature toy as with the larger toy, (2) the relevant part of the 
child’s body for executing that behavior came into full contact with the relevant part of 
the miniature toy, and (3) the child made a serious attempt to perform the action. One or 
two additional coders then evaluated each potential scale error and 100% agreement was 
required between the coders for the behavior to be identified as a scale error.
The distinction between serious attempt to perform an inappropriate action and 
pretend play was carefully taken into account. All the videotapes were independently 
coded to identify for instances of pretend play and scale errors were reliably 
distinguished from pretend play where 58 pretend play episodes were identified. 
Examples of pretend play included pushing the toy car around on the ground while 
making car noises or sliding down the slide with their hand. The researchers pointed out 
that there was no overlap between the behaviors coded as scale errors and those coded as 
pretend play.
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The results of this study indicated that scale errors were committed by 25 of the 
54 children and the coders reliably identified 40 instances of scale errors. Fourteen of the 
scale errors occurred without the experimenter drawing attention to the target object and 
the results showed no relation between the amount of time spent with the larger target 
object and the probability of committing a scale error with the miniature target object.
The number of errors did differ significantly by age with most of the scale errors 
occurring with children around 2 years of age.
DeLoache and colleagues speculated many reasons for this apparent inability of 
the toddlers to use visual information about the object’s size to guide their actions. The 
researchers first set up an independent control study to rule out that the children simply 
preferred to interact with the miniature object or that there is a general inability to make 
appropriate size judgments. The researchers recruited 8 children between 19 and 28 
months of age and presented them individually with pairs of large and small objects 
simultaneously and asked the children to perform a target action. The various target 
actions included: “Come and sit in the chair,” “Can you go down the side,” and “Drive 
the car over here.” The results indicated that the children were able to distinguish 
between the two objects and were able to choose the correct object to interact with when 
prompted with a target action by the experimenter.
If children are capable of discriminating between the larger and smaller object and 
are able to choose the appropriate object that corresponds with a target action when the 
objects are presented together, then why do the children seem to fail at matching the 
correct response to the corresponding object size? DeLoache and colleagues pointed out 
that a special feature of these scale errors is that the children in fact do take into account
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the object’s size when interacting with the object. For example, when a child starts to 
initiate a scale error with the miniature car, instead of making large scale motions as with 
the larger toy car, the child bends down to get close to the miniature car and uses a 
smaller grasping action to open the small door and directs their foot toward the small 
door opening. The same general actions that were performed with the larger toy were 
attempted with the smaller toy but it seems as though the children adjusted their 
movements to the size of the smaller toy.
Similar to the various theories explaining the A-not-B error and the card sort 
error, DeLoache and colleagues proposed that the scale errors involve a dissociation 
when using visual information for planning vs. controlling of actions. They believe that 
when a child sees a replica of a highly familiar object, the visual information from that 
object activates the child’s representation for the larger object. This activated 
representation also includes motor responses associated with the object and the child is 
unable to inhibit the activated motor responses and therefore commits a scale error. To 
account for the children’s adjusted movements to the size of the smaller object, the 
researchers believe that it is after the action plan is initiated that the child uses the visual 
information about the object size to calibrate movements and motions directed at the 
object.
Just like the previous two developmental errors, there seems to be an emphasis on 
the failure of inhibitory control. DeLoache and colleagues recognize that infants and 
children have difficulty inhibiting prepotent responses but they do not believe that 
difficulty with inhibitory control can fully explain scale errors. The researchers also 
suggest that the dissociation between the use of visual information for planning versus
14
control could substantiate dual process theories of visual processing. There are many 
theories of visual processing but one of the most cited, and acknowledged by DeLoache 
and colleagues, is the two visual system hypothesis (Goodale & Milner, 1992; 
Underleider & Mishkin, 1982; Schneider, 1967). This theory speculates the existence of 
two neurally and functionally distinct visual systems for action and perception. The 
dorsal visual stream would mediate the control of visually guided actions whereas the 
ventral stream facilitates perceptual and cognitive representations of objects. Evidence 
for the existence of two visual systems has been supported by studies looking at apparent 
dissociations in action and perception expressed by brain-damaged individuals and 
normal responses to visual illusions (Glover, 2004; Goodale & Milner, 1992).
The two visual system hypothesis (TVSH) is supported, in part, by the finding 
that grip formation during grasping is largely immune to the influence of many pictorial 
illusions (e.g., Aglioti, DeSouza, & Goodale, 1995). Such results suggest that one visual 
stream controls illusion-susceptible perceptual judgments, while a separate stream 
controls illusion-resistant visually-guided actions (Glover, 2004; Milner & Goodale, 
1995). Much of the evidence for the dissociation of the two visual pathways comes from 
studies with brain damaged patients who were either suffering form lesions in the 
posterior parietal lobe or the inferior temporal lobe. Patients with lesions in the posterior 
parietal lobe were impaired in visuomotor coordination while patients with inferior 
temporal lobe damage had trouble recognizing objects (Goodale & Milner, 1992).
Different variations of the judgment and reaching tasks using a commonly known 
visual illusion called the Ebbinghaus illusion have produced inconsistent results, leading 
many researchers to dispute conclusions regarding the two visual system hypothesis
15
(Franz, 2001; Glover, 2004; Smeets, Brenner, de Grave, & Cuijpers, 2002; Vishton & 
Fabre, 2003; Vishton, Rea, Cutting, & Nunez, 1998). This hypothesis implies the 
presence of two relatively independent, parallel processing streams but recent results by 
Vishton, Stephens, Nelson, Morra, Brunick, and Stevens (2007) have suggested, 
however, that as a participant prepares to reach for a target, all visually-mediated 
responses become less sensitive to the illusion. There is evidence for different visual 
processing for reaching and non-reaching tasks, but the changes seem to happen on a 
system-wide basis, influencing all visually guided tasks to the same degree. Based on 
recent evidence it could be contended that the human visual system possesses two 
separate modes of processing, one for non-action, verbal responses, and another for 
visually-guided actions (Brito, Brunick, & Vishton, in prep; Vishton et al., 2007)
DeLoache and colleagues believe that scale errors imply an immaturity in the 
interaction of the two visual streams of processing which is exhibited by the intermittent 
failure to integrate the visual information processed by the two systems. In their 
description of a scale error, the information about the identity of an object, processed by 
the ventral stream, is not integrated with information about the object’s size, which is 
processed by the dorsal system. In a review article, Scott Glover (2004) indicated that the 
scale error research, “offers a unique example of how stored representations of object 
affordances combined with semantic category knowledge, can overpower immediate 
visual information in the undeveloped mind” (p. 442). Glover stated that the scale error 
explanation proposed by DeLoache and colleagues assumes that children (1) have a 
stored concept of the toy’s actual size in the real world, (2) are able to judge the actual 
size of the toy (demonstrated by the child’s calibrated movements toward the object), and
16
(3) experience an interference between the stored concept of the object and the toy itself 
when an action plan is prepared (Glover, 2004).
Another model presented to explain the occurrence of scale errors presented by 
DeLoache and colleagues (2004) and highly supported by Glover (2004) is the planning- 
control model. This model supports the idea that the planning portion of a behavior is 
influenced by numerous cognitive variables including semantics, visual illusions, and 
memories of past actions. Stored semantic knowledge for a target object evokes a specific 
response but once the movement is initiated, the on-line control system (which is 
uninfluenced by semantic knowledge) ensures correct movement based on the toy’s 
actual size (Glover, 2004; Glover, 2002; Glover & Dixon, 2001). The planning-control 
model argues that action planning involves a medial visual stream terminating in the 
inferior parietal lobes before a response is initiated (Boussaoud, Ungerleider, & 
Desimone, 1990). The hypothesized key difference between the planning-control model 
and the action-perception model is that the planning-control model predicts that the early 
portion of the child’s movement toward the object would be influenced by the stored 
object representation, movements are then adjusted in flight to the actual size of the toy, 
whereas the action-perception model predicts that movements toward the object are 
appropriately scaled from the beginning and there is no interference between stored 
knowledge and behavior towards the object (Glover, 2004).
Thesis Overview
The planning-control model and the action-perception model attempt to explain 
the unique intricacies of this developmental error but like the A-not-B error and card sort 
error, the definite cause(s) is still unclear. Could the occurrence of scale errors be
17
generally due to the perseveration of automatic responses or are children misperceiving 
the target object? In the following set of experiments we attempt to distinguish what cues 
or object characteristics will increase or decrease the chance of these scale errors. Studies 
have demonstrated that children will reach for objects with one- or two-handed grips that 
are matched to the size of the reaching target. Infants usually begin reaching around 4 
months of age and at that time their reaching efforts are poorly controlled and are often 
performed with two hands regardless of the objects’ size (Thelen, Corbetta, Kamm, 
Spencer, Schneider, & Zemicke, 1993; von Hofsten, 1979) and by 8 months of age, 
infants can preshape their handgrip configuration to adapt to the object’s shape and 
orientation (von Hofsten & Fazel-Zandy, 1984).
We have replaced the three target toys from the original scale error research with 
identical objects (cylinders or rectangles) of varying size (See Figure 1) and have 
associated the occurrence of a scale error to the frequency with which a two-handed grip 
is selected for objects of different sizes. That is, a scale error (performing an 
inappropriate action based on the object’s size) is similar to a child using an inappropriate 
handgrip (one- versus two-handed reach) based on the object’s size. We have examined 
the role motor priming or perseverative reaching plays on the frequency of two-handed 
reaches and what cues (size versus shape) are more salient for the child in determining 
appropriate handgrip.
The last experiment looks to try to understand the child’s comprehension of the 
changing state of the object by convincing the child that one object is being transformed 
into varying sizes or that several independent objects (all fully visible) are presented to 
the child. Another key distinction between this study and the original scale error research
18
is that a much wider age range of participants has been recruited for the various 
experiments. Although DeLoache and colleagues found results that scale errors are 
committed more frequently around 2 years of age, we believe that children of all ages 
(and possibly even adults) can commit these errors given the precise cues and situation. 
The following experiments look at the various factors necessary for an individual to 
commit a scale error and how manipulating those factors can influence an individual’s 
behavioral response.
EXPERIMENT 1: FREQUENCY OF TWO-HANDED REACHES AS A FUNCTION
OF OBJECT SIZE 
The first experiment examined how experience reaching for an object of a 
particular size and shape influences later reaches for other objects. Specifically, we 
assessed the frequency of one-versus -two-hand reaches. The experimenter presented the 
participants with a series of objects that were identical in shape, but varied in size, and 
encouraged them to reach out and lift them. We predicted that familiarization with a 
particular size would impact how participants will reach for other objects that may differ 
in size but not shape. For example, if a child successfully has reached for the first object 
using a one-handed grip, he or she will tend to reach for all objects with that shape using 
a one-handed grip, even if the type of grip is inappropriate. To explore if the effect was 
only due to some characteristic of the particular stimuli, some participants were presented 
with rectangular blocks instead of cylinders. These rectangular blocks were constructed 
to match the height and width of the cylinder stimuli.
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Method
Participants. We recruited forty children (21 males, 19 females) ages 2-to-5 
years of age (M^ 34.00 months, SD= 13.00 months) from the surrounding community for 
the cylinder condition and six children (3 males, 3 females) ages 1 -to-4 years of age (M= 
27.47 moths, SD= 11.79 months) were recruited for the rectangle condition. There were 
five age categories with six children in the 1 -year-old group, eighteen children in the 2- 
year-old group, nine children in the 3-year-old group, ten children in the 4-year-old group 
and two children in the 5-and-older group. We obtained parental informed consent at the 
start of the procedure and at the end of the study we offered the children a small toy or 
sticker for their participation.
Displays and Apparatus. Participants sat in a chair (45 cm tall) in front of a table 
surface (73 cm tall X 152 cm wide x 76 cm in depth). All the participants were presented 
with seven identical cylinders (identical in shape, color, and texture) of varying size. The 
ratio of width to height was always 1.35 cm. The seven widths were: (1) 2.7 cm, (2) 3.3 
cm (3) 4.0 cm, (4) 5.8 cm, (5) 6.9 cm, (6) 10.1 cm, and (7) 12.7 cm in diameter. The 
largest object was too large for most children to grasp easily with one hand. We presented 
the target cylinders to the children on a thin rectangular wooden board (45.5 cm tall x 61 
cm wide x 5 mm thick).
Design. Participants completed 22 reaching trials. All participants began with five 
trials with the smallest cylinder, then each of the other cylinders in order of size up to the 
largest cylinder. The experimenter then presented the participant with five trials of the 
largest cylinder, then each of the other cylinders in order of size down to the smallest 
cylinder (or in reverse with the largest cylinder primed first). We randomly assigned each
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participant, without replacement, to one of two size conditions (smallest cylinder primed 
first vs. largest cylinder primed first).
Procedure. The participants sat in the chair or in the caregiver’s lap. The height of 
the chair was adjusted so that the participants could easily reach for the objects. If the 
participant was seated in the caregiver’s lap, the caregiver was instructed to not interfere 
with the study procedure. The experimenter began the procedure by placing an occluding 
panel in position in front of the participant to obscure her view while the experimenter 
placed the first target object onto the middle of the presentation board. The start of the 
trial was indicated when the occluding panel was removed. The presentation board then 
was pushed toward the participant until the target object was within reach. The 
participant was then asked to reach and pick up the target object. The experimenter 
retrieved the object and the process was repeated for the other various sizes. The end of 
the trial was marked by the removal of the presentation board by the experimenter. If the 
participant lost interest or became agitated before all the trials were completed, the 
session was terminated. All trials were videotaped to record a side-view of the 
participant’s reaching behavior and the entire procedure lasted approximately 25 minutes.
Data Scoring and Analysis. The trials were coded from the videotapes by an 
independent observer using the Noldus Observer XT 7.0 (Wageningen, The Netherlands) 
program. The videotapes were coded for the observation of one vs. two handed reaches 
toward the object and whether the participant was successfully able to pick up the object. 
The start of a trial was coded with the forward movement of the presentation board and 
each hand was scored separately. A right and left hand reach within one second of each 
other within the same trial was coded as a two-handed reach.
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We examined the frequency with which a two-handed grip is selected for objects 
of different sizes. A Repeated-Measures ANOVA was used with object size, prime 
direction (whether the objects were presented from smallest to largest or largest to 
smallest), and age category as the independent variables and percentage of two-handed 
reaches as the dependent variable.
Results and Discussion 
The frequency of two-handed reaches was found to be a function of the object 
size. The size of the initial object prime did influence the type of reach performed for 
successive reaches. We did not find a significant difference for object shape (cylinders 
versus rectangles), F(l,34) = 0.001,/? = .981, so for subsequent analyses we collapsed the 
data across these conditions. We found significant main effects for prime direction, 
F(l,30) = 9.100,/? = 0.005, r|p2= .233 and object size, F(4,120) = 13.394,p  < .005, rjp2 = 
.309. Figures 1 shows a significant interaction for prime direction and object size, 
F(4,120) = 5.933,/? < .005, ilP2= .165 for both the cylinder and rectangle condition. We 
did not find any significant differences between the age categories, F(l,30) = 0.627,/? = 
0.647. When children were primed with the smallest object and then presented with test 
objects varying in size up to the largest object, there was a strong tendency to reach with 
one hand (or vice versa for the large prime). These results would indicate that there is 
strong tendency to use the same type of reach after being primed with a specific sized 
target and these results were not due to a unique characteristic (specific shape) of the 
target object.
EXPERIMENT 2: FREQUENCY OF TWO-HANDED REACHES AS A FUNCTION
OF OBJECT SIZE AND OBJECT SHAPE
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The second experiment examined how object size and shape familiarity 
influenced the frequency of one or two-handed reaches when the participant is primed 
with a particular size and a particular shape. We predicted that familiarization with a 
particular size and shape would impact how participants would reach for other objects 
and that the frequency of one or two handed reaches would be more consistent if the 
shape did not change. We also predicted that changing the shape of the object would 
influence the participant’s grip selection more than the size of the object.
Method
Participants. We recruited 102 children (52 males, 50 females) ages l-to-4 years 
of age (M= 25.98 months, SD= 12.74 months) from the surrounding community. There 
were five age categories with forty children in the 1 -year-old group, twenty-five children 
in the 2-year-old group, twenty-one children in the 3-year-old group, and sixteen children 
in the 4-year-old group. We obtained parental informed consent at the start of the 
procedure and at the end of the study we offered the children a small toy or sticker for 
their participation.
Procedure. The materials, study design, procedure, and analysis were identical to 
those described in Experiment 1 except as noted here. The participants completed 28 
trials and were only presented with the smallest (1), largest (7), and middle-sized (5) 
objects. The ratio of width to height was always 1.35 cm and the three widths were: (1) 
2.7 cm, (5) 6.9 cm, and (7) 12.7 cm in diameter. The experimenter presented the 
participant with five trials of the smallest object, then one trial of the middle-size and 
largest object each. The presentation of objects was repeated, and then the order was 
reversed with five trials of the largest object and one trial of the middle-size and smallest
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object (or vice-versa with the participant starting with the largest prime). The shape of the 
two test objects either remained the same after the prime object or changed shape.
We examined the frequency with which a two-handed grip is selected for objects 
of different sizes. A Repeated-Measures ANOVA was used to assess how the frequency 
of two-handed reaches varied as a function of age, initial prime size, and object shape.
Results and Discussion 
Across all five age categories we found a significant main effect for the initial 
prime size, F(l,85) = 29.045,/? < .005, r|p2= .255 and a significant interaction for initial 
prime size and object shape, F(l,85) = 7.048,/? < .005, r|p2= .077 (Figure 2). We did not 
find a significant main effect for object shape across all six age categories, F(l,85) = 
2.882,/? = .093 (Figure 3). These results indicated that like the previous experiment, the 
initial prime size is an influential factor in the frequency of two-handed reaches. An 
interesting finding in this experiment is the tendency to stay with the same reach type for 
objects with the same shape but not for objects with a different shape. When a child is 
primed with a particular sized object she is more likely to continue with that reach type 
(one versus two-handed reach) for objects with the same shape and will change reach 
type when a different shaped object is presented.
Further analyses revealed a significant main effect for shape, F(1,91) = 8.813,/? = 
0.004, V = -88> across all age categories for the smallest object prime but not for the 
largest object prime. We found no significant differences for object shape within each age 
category individually but when consecutive age groups were examined we did find 
significant differences: (1) One-year-olds & Two-year-olds F(l,57) = 5.980,/? = .018, rjp2 
= .095, (2) Two-year-olds & Three-year-olds F(l,38) = 7.517,/? = .009, r|p2 = .165, and
24
(3) Three-year-olds & Four-year-olds F(l,32) = 7.891,/? = .008, r|p2 = .198. The results 
demonstrated differences between adjoining age groups for object shape but there is no 
definite trend or peak frequency, which made it difficult to assess any developmental 
differences. The relationship between object shape and small prime size could be due to 
the small hand size of the children and this will be determined in future analyses.
The first two experiments look at how the object characteristics can influence the 
occurrence of one or two-handed reaches. Experiment 2 indicates the presence of shape- 
specific action perseveration and the following experiment explored whether it is simply 
shape-specific perseveration or individual object-specific perseveration that produced the 
observed trend.
EXPERIMENT 3: FREQUENCY OF TWO-HANDED REACHES AS A FUNCTION 
OF THE NUMBER OF OBJECTS VISIBLE
The third experiment explored the idea of scale errors further by examining the 
child’s knowledge of the object. In the previous experiments and in the original scale 
error research, the children were presented with various objects of different sizes to 
interact with, but how the child conceptualized the changing size of the object is 
unknown.
In this experiment, we attempted to bridge from the occurrence of scale errors 
(frequency of one vs. two-handed reaches and inappropriate grip type) to the child’s 
understanding of the changing state of the object. We presented the children with one of 
two extremes: (1) a “transformation machine” that seems to transform the same object 
from one size to another and (2) visual access to all three objects while performing the 
trial. That is, in the transformation condition, participants were led to believe that only
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one object was used throughout the experiment. In the visual access condition, it was 
made clear that a collection of three objects was used. We predicted a higher occurrence 
of scale errors if the child believed that the object was the same, and we predicted that 
this would produce inappropriate grip types even if there were drastic changes in size.
Method
Participants. We recruited 146 children (73 males, 73 females) ages 2-to-6 years 
of age (M= 54.59 months, SD= 9.97 months) from the surrounding community. There 
were four age categories with thirteen children in the 3-year-old group, fifty children in 
the 4-year-old group, sixty-seven children in the 5-year-old group, and sixteen children in 
the 6-and-older group. We obtained parental informed consent at the start of the 
procedure and at the end of the study we offered the children a small toy or sticker for 
their participation.
Displays and Apparatus. Participants sat in a chair (45 cm tall) in front of a table 
surface (73 cm tall X 152 cm wide x 76 cm in depth). The participants were only 
presented with the smallest (1), largest (7), and middle-sized (5) cylinders. The largest 
object was too large for most children to grasp easily with one hand. The target cylinders 
were presented to the children on a rectangular board (27.0 cm long x 21.5 cm wide x 1 
cm thick). A smaller board was used in this experiment to fit underneath of the 
transformation machine. The transformation machine consisted of 5 air condition vents 
assembled together around a wooden frame (53.5 cm long x 38.5 cm wide x 38.5 cm tall). 
The bottom of the crate was open in order for the machine to be placed over the target 
objects and there was a trap door on the back of the machine to covertly change the 
objects without the participant’s knowledge. The transformation machine made futuristic
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mechanical noises and flashed a bright light when engaged with a switch on the front 
exterior. Two identical toy trains (big - 6.1 cm long x 3.2 cm wide x 4.2 cm tall and small 
-13 cm long x 5.5 cm wide x 7.6 cm tall) were used to demonstrate how the machine 
worked and the transformation machine was only used in the transformation condition.
Design. Participants completed 21 reaching trials. All participants began with five 
trials with the smallest or largest cylinder, then each of the other cylinders in order of 
size. The process was then repeated twice more. We randomly assigned each participant, 
without replacement, to one of two size conditions (small prime vs. large prime) and to 
one of two experiment conditions (transformation vs. fully visible).
Procedure. The participants sat in the chair or in the caregiver’s lap. The height of 
the chair was adjusted so that the participants could easily reach for the objects. If the 
participant was seated in the caregiver’s lap, the caregiver was instructed to not interfere 
with the study procedure.
In the transformation condition the experimenter began the experiment by 
familiarizing the child with the transformation machine. All exterior sides of the machine 
were shown to the child and the capability of the machine was also explained. The 
researcher explained to the participant that the machine could make objects bigger or 
smaller (the red button on the machine made objects smaller and the blue button on the 
machine made objects bigger).
The researcher first performed a demonstration before the test trials. The 
experimenter placed an occluding panel in position in front of the participant to obscure 
their view while the experimenter placed the bigger toy train onto the middle of the 
presentation board. The occluding panel was removed and the experimenter stated to the
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child that the machine was going to make the toy smaller. The transformation box was 
put over the train and the participant was instructed by a second experimenter to push the 
red button and turn on the switch to start the machine. While the participant was 
preoccupied with the lights and sounds, the first experimenter switched the bigger toy 
train for the smaller toy train through the trap door. When notified by the first 
experimenter, the second experimenter instructed the participant to turn off the machine. 
The transformation machine was lifted aside and the smaller toy train was revealed to the 
participant. The process was then repeated going from the smaller toy train to the bigger 
toy train (the participant this time was instructed to push the blue button in order to make 
the toy bigger again).
After the demonstration period ended the test trials began. The start of the trial 
was indicated when the occluding panel was removed and the presentation board was 
pushed toward the participant until the target object was within reach. The participant 
was then asked to reach and pick up the target object. The experimenter held the 
occluding panel to the side until the participant picked up the target object, after which 
the process was repeated for the other various sizes. The end of the trial was marked by 
the removal of the presentation board by the experimenter. The key point in the 
transformation condition is that anytime the target object changed size (big to small or 
small to big), the transformation machine was used to convince the child that the same 
object was being manipulated and presented.
In the fully visible condition, the procedure is identical to those described in the 
transformation condition except as noted here. The transformation machine is never used 
and there was no demonstration with the toy trains. All three cylinders were in plain view
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on the table, but not within reaching distance, of the participant the at all times and were 
only hidden from the participant’s view by the occluding panel when a new object was 
being placed on the presentation board (in order to reduce experimenter influence of one 
or two handed grip selection of the object). To rule out the possibility of a delay effect in 
the transformation condition, in the fully visible condition the experimenter waited five to 
seven seconds (the same amount of time as the transformation condition) before 
presenting a different sized target object to the participant. The key point in the fully 
visible condition is that all three cylinders are in view when the participant is reaching for 
the target object, in an effort to make the size changes more apparent.
If the participant lost interest or became agitated before all the trials were 
completed, the session was terminated. All trials were videotaped to record a side-view of 
the participant’s reaching behavior and the entire procedure lasted approximately 25 
minutes.
Data Scoring and Analysis. The trials were coded from the videotapes by an 
independent observer using the Noldus Observer XT 7.0 (Wageningen, The Netherlands) 
program. The videotapes were coded for the observation of one vs. two handed reaches 
toward the object and whether the participant was successfully able to pick up the object. 
The start of a trial was coded with the forward movement of the presentation board and 
each hand was scored separately. A right and left hand reach within one second of each 
other within the same trial was coded as a two-handed reach.
We examined the frequency with which a two-handed grip is selected for objects 
of different sizes. A 2x2 ANOVA was used to assess how the frequency of two-handed 
reaches varied as a function of initial prime size and experiment condition.
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Results and Discussion 
The frequency of two-handed reaches was a function of the object size and 
influenced by both the experimental condition and the initial object prime. We performed 
an ANOVA with condition and initial prime size as the independent factors and the 
percentage of two-handed reaches as the single dependent variable. Significantly more 
two-handed reaching was found in the fully visible (M=0.545, SE=0.038) than in the 
transformation condition (M=0.381, SD=0.039), F(l,142) = 9.816,/? = .003, r|p2= .057 
(Figure 4). This main effect was unexpected, but not central to the question at hand. At 
issue is the influence of target size increase and decrease on this measure.
We also found a significant difference between the initial prime size F(l, 142) = 
55.908,/? < .005, r|p2= .289. Children across all four age categories were significantly 
more likely to reach for the target object with two-hands in the fully visible condition and 
were more likely to reach with two-hands if they were primed with the larger cylinder 
first. Figure 5 shows a significant interaction between experimental condition and initial 
prime size F(l,142) = 32.397,/? < .005, r|p2 = .181 indicating that children in the fully 
visible condition were more likely than children in the transformation condition to 
continue with the same type of reach as the reach used during the initial prime.
Preliminary analyses indicated that there were no significant differences between 
the four age categories for the frequency of two-handed reaches but individual analyses 
were performed on each category to determine any developmental trends. We found 
significance for initial prime size in each of the four age categories: (1) Three-year-olds 
F(l,8) = 11.191,/? = 0.010, rjp2= .583, (2) Four-year-olds F(l,48) = 21.628,/? < .005, r|p2 
= .311, (3) Five-year-olds F(l,65) = 18.015,/? < .005, r\p2 = .217, and (4) Six-year-olds
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F(l,9) = 6.997,p  = 0.027, r|p2 = .437. We did not find a significant main effect for 
condition or an interaction effect for the three-year-olds and the six-year-olds but did find 
a significant interaction of condition and initial prime size for the four-year-olds, F(l,48) 
= 7.867, p  = 0.007, T|p2 = .141. The five-year-old age group was the only age category to 
have significant values for the experiment condition, F(l,65) = 9.002,p  = 0.004, rjp2-  
.122, and the interaction, F(l,65) = 17.219,p  < .005, r|p2= .209, as well as the initial 
prime size. These results suggest that the effects of condition and initial prime size are 
the most influential within the five-year-old category but it should be noted that the five- 
year-old category also had the highest number of participants and the age differences 
could be attributed to sample size differences. Further trials to even the sample sizes need 
to be performed before any conclusive developmental trends can be assessed.
General Discussion 
The demonstration of scale errors in the original research by DeLoache and 
colleagues is a unique observation of the intricacies of the cognitive, perceptual, and 
motor systems. It has been shown that from the age of three, children are capable of 
perceiving what objects afford action for themselves or others (Rochat, 1995) but clearly 
the scale error studies exhibit failure to either demonstrate this knowledge or inhibit a 
strong motor tendency. In our current set of studies we have tried to systematically tease 
apart the distinctive characteristics that make up this developmental error. Like both the 
A-not-B-error task and the card sort task, the incidences of scale errors can be influenced 
by slight changes in task ambiguity or difficulty, which could suggest that the cause of 
scale errors can be explained better by motor priming or perseverative behavior accounts.
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In the first experiment we looked at the frequency of two-handed reaches as a 
function of the object size. To reach accurately toward an object involves encoding its 
location and grasping an object requires coding of the intrinsic features of the object such 
as its size, shape, and orientation (Arbib, 1985; Jeannerod, 1988). Newell, Scully, 
McDonald, and Baillargeon (1989) demonstrated a systematic relationship between the 
size of the object and the number of fingers used in the grip for infants as young as four 
months of age. We found a definite relationship between object size and the number of 
hands used to pick up the object and there was a strong motor priming tendency where 
children were inclined to stay with the same reach type after the priming trials. The 
results also indicated that this relationship was not particular to a specific object shape. 
We did not find any significant age differences between groups for the frequency of two- 
handed reaches, which could indicate that the error of using an inappropriate reach type 
could be demonstrated across all ages (even with adults) if a particular situation is 
presented.
The second experiment looked at the frequency of two-handed reaches as a 
function of both size and shape of the object. Studies have indicated that infants can 
process feature information and use this information to individuate objects (Wilcox & 
Baillargeon, 1998; Wilcox & Schweinle, 2002). Wilcox (1999) demonstrated that infants 
could use characteristics of shape at seven months, texture at eleven months, and color at 
twelve months of age to distinguish objects. We found the same relationship between 
object size and two-handed reaches, but our results also indicated that the tendency to 
continue reaching with the same reach type decreases when presented with a different 
shaped object.
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The ability to discriminate objects based on properties/characteristics has been 
demonstrated in many studies. Bushnell and Boudreau (1993) found that some properties 
such as size and temperature demand minimal control of the hand and fingers, whereas 
other properties such as weight and shape require much greater control and attention. The 
researchers also reviewed ages at which infants first discriminate different object 
properties and concluded that the sequence corresponds to developmental changes in the 
control of the hand and fingers. Needham and Baillargeon (1995) found that infants by 
the age of eight months can use object properties, such as color and shape, to help them 
interpret ambiguous arrangements of objects and this ability was shown for four and five 
month old infants when infants were given prior experience with the objects.
Our results indicate that the object property of shape is salient enough to decrease 
the perseverative behavior across all ages. Cook and Odom (1992) found that 5-year-olds, 
11-year-olds and adults all avoided classifications based on overall similarity of objects 
and instead paid attention to single dimensions. Many classification studies have shown 
that some dimensions are more salient to individuals than others (Odom & Cook, 1984; 
Thompson & Massaro, 1989). Perhaps the greater control needed to grasp for different 
shaped objects (or change of grip formation) and the higher salience for the property of 
shape lead to the disruption of the motor priming in this task. We are currently 
conducting a study on the relationship between two-handed reaches as a function of 
object size, object shape, and object color to assess what properties decrease 
perseverative behavior and to what extent.
The last experiment examined reaching responses based on the number of known 
or visible objects. In the fully visible condition all the objects, and the apparent size
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differences between the three objects, were visible to the participant. The perseverative 
reaching behavior still occurred across all age groups and this result supports the motor 
priming explanation. The children had access to size difference information but could not 
make appropriate reaches after being primed with the small or large prime. Prior studies 
have found that infants who reach immediately after the cue (no time delay) in the A-not- 
B-error task were less likely to perseverate and more likely to make the correct choice 
(Wellman, et al., 1986). In the fully visible condition, after the priming the children were 
exposed to a delay before being presented with the target object and the frequency of 
two-handed reaches was still related to the initial prime object size.
In the transformation condition we wanted the child to believe that the same 
object was being presented each time but in varying sizes. This concept originated from a 
study conducted by DeLoache, Miller, and Rosengren (1997) where the researchers 
compared the performance of 2 Vz- year-olds in symbolic and nonsymbolic versions of a 
search task. The children in the symbolic condition had to watch the experimenter hide a 
toy in the larger room and then find the toy in a scale model of the room, which was 
located in an adjoining room. The children in the nonsymbolic condition were told that a 
shrinking machine could make the room (and all the components of the room) larger or 
smaller. The children in the nonsymbolic condition first watched the experimenter hide 
the toy in the larger room, and then were escorted out of the room while the shrinking 
machine transformed the room. The children returned to the room to find the scale model 
and were instructed to find the toy. The children in the nonsymbolic search task were 
much more successful retrieving the toy than the children in the symbolic condition. The 
researchers reasoned that 2 Vz - year-olds have difficulty representing symbolic relations
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and therefore the children in the symbolic condition were not able to use the scale model 
as a symbol for the larger room.
In the original scale error research and in the first two experiments presented, the 
number of objects presented to the child is not explicit. In the transformation condition 
we wanted the child to believe that the same object was being presented with the 
reasoning that if the child thinks it’s the same object, then they would be more inclined to 
use the previous reach style. One possibility is that the transformation condition 
heightened their attention and therefore made the children more aware of the size 
differences. Diamond (1998) found that infants made significantly fewer A-not-B-errors 
when the toy was different from the toy used on previous trials and when the infants’ 
interest in that toy was high. In the same study, all infants reached correctly, even with a 
delay, if the researcher substituted pieces of cookie for the hidden toys in the task.
Another explanation for the decrease in perseverative reaching could be attributed 
to the verbal cues in the transformation condition. The children could have associated the 
appropriate reach with the words “bigger” and “smaller” used by the experimenter. In a 
future study we would like to perform the transformation condition without the verbal 
cues and analyze the frequency change of reach type. If more errors occur we can 
attribute our results to the verbal cues, and no change in errors or fewer errors would 
support the attention explanation. In future studies we would also like to increase our 
sample size, especially for the younger age groups, to not only assess developmental 
trends but to also look for similarities and differences between our set of studies and the 
original scale error research.
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A key difference between our studies and the original scale error research is the 
idea of object representation. We viewed the original scale errors as a visuomotor 
phenomenon where the child identified the object’s shape, color and texture but ignored 
the size of the object when producing a behavioral response. An alternative explanation is 
that this is a cognitive phenomenon and this alternative would predict that the child 
identified the object’s name or purpose and this representation influenced the occurrence 
of the errors. The target objects used in the original scale error research were all highly 
familiar objects and it could be assumed that many of the children had various levels of 
experience with these objects. The target objects in our research were not as familiar to 
the children and the low level of experience could be a factor in the rate of perseveration. 
In a future study we would like to explore the idea of scale errors as a cognitive 
phenomenon and present children with the target objects but label the objects to make the 
object’s identity more salient to the child.
As Thelen, Schoner, Scheier, and Smith (2001) suggest, information is not as 
simple as the traditional input-transduction-output stream, and because perception, action, 
decision, execution, and memory all work together, information is often time-based and 
responses reflect patterns of cooperative and competitive interactions. The failure or error 
in the A-not-B, card sort, and scale error tasks all come from the same multiple processes 
that produce goal-directed reaching at any age. The experiments in this thesis aimed to 
further add to the existing literature to fully understand what features or characteristics 
infants/children look at to help them understand how to interact with objects and the 
developing relationship between the perception and motor systems.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Study Stimuli.
Figure 2. Percentage of two-handed reaches as a function of prime direction and object 
size across all ages for both cylinder and rectangular objects.
Figure 3. Percentage of two-handed reaches as a function of initial prime size and object 
shape.
Figure 4. Percentage of two-handed reaches as a function of object shape across all ages 
when primed with the smallest object.
Figure 5. Percentage of two-handed reaches for both transformation and fully visible 
conditions across all ages.
Figure 6. Percentage of two-handed reaches for experimental condition and initial prime 
size across all ages.
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